Reflections on Factual Causation by Phillips, Jerry J.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1978 
Issue 4 A Tribute to Arno Cumming Becht 
January 1978 
Reflections on Factual Causation 
Jerry J. Phillips 
University of Tennessee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Jerry J. Phillips, Reflections on Factual Causation, 1978 WASH. U. L. Q. 661 (1978). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss4/7 
This Tribute is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
REFLECTIONS ON FACTUAL CAUSATION
JERRY J. PHILLIPS*
A major thesis of the Becht-Miller book on factual causation is that
since causation is a factual issue, "courts should not pass to the consid-
eration of values until they have exhausted the possibilities of answer-
ing the question of fact-in short, until they know either what the fact
was or know that they do not know and why they do not know."' The
authors take issue with Professor Malone2 who advocates mixing fac-
tual and evaluative considerations in determining cause in fact, or at
least contends that the two are inseparably bound together in the
factfinding process.'
The Becht-Miller thesis raises two major questions. First, can we
really identify cause in fact as something separate from our own value
judgments, which are so critical in determining proximate or legal
cause? And second, is it likely to make a difference in legal outcome
whether we follow the Becht-Miller approach or the Malone approach?
The authors' answer to the first question is disarmingly simple. They
assume "that men have some true knowledge of causal sequences in the
world,"4 and that our reasoning on the subject corresponds with "com-
mon sense ideas of the events of ordinary life."5 Thus, dropping a book
on one's foot causes injury whether the book is blue or red, and there-
fore the color of the book is not a cause of the injury; but shaking a
door causes vibrations even though the effect may completely dissipate
within a matter of minutes.'
Perhaps we intuitively know such things in much the way Kant per-
ceived his human maxims.' But the authors' answer to Professor Ma-
* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A., 1956, Yale University;
M A., 1958, Cambridge University, England; J.D., 1961, Yale Law School.
1. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND
STRICT LIABILITY CASES 20 (1961).
2. Malone, Ruminations on Cause in Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956).
3. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note I, at 3-8.
4. Id. at 9.
5. Id. at 151.
6. Id. at 14, 139.
7. I. KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 547 (1929).
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lone on this point is not completely satisfactory. Malone contends that
persons perceive different causes of an event depending on their per-
spective, e.g., as a neighbor, engineer, physicist, judge, or doctor.8
Becht and Miller concede this, but respond that all of these perceptions
may be factually correct. Most events have many actual causes, and
"[tihe fact that a person selects a cause for reasons of his own does not
make cause evaluative."9
The authors neatly avoid joining issue with Professor Malone by
concluding that all of the alleged causes are factual causes. Malone's
hypothetical is that of a young driver whose speeding car throws a rock
into a pedestrian. Becht and Miller assert that a neighbor might view
the driver's parents as the cause.10 But is this because they, knowing he
was a reckless driver, allowed him to drive or simply because they bred
and raised him? John Donne's statement, "[a]ny man's death dimin-
ishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde,"II is a noble pronounce-
ment, but it hardly corresponds with our common sense knowledge of
causal sequences any more than does calling parents the cause of their
child's conduct simply because they are parents.
If we possess common sense knowledge of causal sequences, why
should there be any disagreement whether one event is the cause of
another? The answer must be that some of us are more perceptive than
others. But is not the determination of perceptiveness evaluative, thus
rendering the causal determination evaluative also?
The parallel series approach demonstrates the problem of determin-
ing factual cause. Becht and Miller initially use this approach to deter-
mine whether an omission 2 is the factual cause of an event. If the
event would not happen when the omitted act is supplied, they treat the
omission as causal; but if the event would happen even after the omis-
sion is supplied, they treat it as noncausal. 13 For example, if a hurri-
cane blows down an unbraced tree, but the tree would have blown
down even if braced, the failure (ie., omission) to brace the tree is not a
8. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 1, at 5-6.
9. Id. at5.
10. Id.
11. J. Donne, Meditation XVII, in THE COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE OF JOHN
DONNE 441 (1952).
12. The authors recognize that "what did not happen cannot be a cause of anything that did
happen, at least not in the sense in which something that did happen can be a cause. It can be
called a 'cause' only in a figurative sense." A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 1, at 22.
13. Id. at 24.
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cause. 14 The parallel series analysis also applies to acts. If the event
would not happen when the act is omitted, the act is causal; but if the
event would happen even after the act is omitted, it is noncausal. Thus,
if an overloaded cable and pulley break, but would have broken even if
properly loaded, the act of overloading is not a cause of the breakage. 15
In contrast, in discussing the famous "two-fires-combining" situa-
tion, the authors say: "Of course, if the defendant's fire actually caused
the harm it would make no difference under our assumptions that the
other fire would have produced the same harm even in precise de-
tail.""6 They probably would find causation here, although they might
reduce damages to reflect the diminished value of the burned property
in view of its impending destruction by the other fire. 7 Similarly, they
would find causation in the shake of a door even if "precisely the same
combinations would have occurred without the shake .. .18 If the
parallel series analysis applies to some situations but not others, the
distinctions are unclear.
Professor Green's principal criticism of the Becht-Miller approach is
directed at their insistence that "the causal relation must be found be-
tween the segment of defendant's conduct that is negligent and the vic-
tim's injury." 9 Green's criticism is difficult to comprehend if one is
basing liability on negligence."0 As to strict liability, the analysis of
factual causation is more complex2' because the inquiry is not re-
stricted to the negligent segment of the conduct, but is broadened to
consider defendant's conduct at large. This analysis resembles Green's
14. Id. at 83.
15. Id. at 57-58.
16. Id. at 18.
17. Id. at 137-38. See notes 29-43 infra and accompanying text.
18. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note I, at 139.
19. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543, 550 (1962).
See A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 1, at 12-13. Professor Green notes that "'[c]ause,' 'fault,'
and 'blame' have a large area of common meaning and are frequently used synonymously."
Green, supra, at 562. This recognition is apparently used by Professor Green to justify imposing
liability in negligence cases where the causal conduct of the defendant is not negligent. Id.
Compare note 20 infra, with note 33 infra.
20. "Through all the diverse theories of proximate cause runs a common thread; all agree
that defendant's wrongful conduct must be a cause in fact of plaintiffs injury before there is
liability." 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1110 (1956). Compare id, with Green,
supra note 19, at 54445 n.4.
21. "As is well known, the fundamental problem of any system of liability which is not fault-
based is the causal problem." Atiyah, Book Reivew, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 340, 344 (1976).
Number 41
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approach to causation in negligence cases.22 So, for example, the au-
thors say that "in the vast majority of cases a principal's acts are simple
causes of his agent's torts and a master's of his servant's, for the
tortfeasor's being where he was or in possession of the equipment that
did the harm was caused by the conduct of his employer. '23 Professor
Leflar, in reviewing the Becht-Miller book,24 takes exception to their
assertion that one who is vicariously liable for the acts of another is a
cause of the actor's tortious conduct "since vicarious liability is itself
based on reasons of policy which exist independently of any causal
forces that may or may not operate between the parties."25
Becht and Miller also stress the distinction between rules of factual
causation and those of damage determination:
The distinction, then which we draw between the cause and the dam-
ages issues is this: If the question is whether the defendant could have
prevented the other source from doing the harm, it is a question of causa-
tion. If the other source would have done the harm anyway, in spite of all
that the defendant could have done to prevent it, the issue is not causa-
tion, but damages.26
Where the issue is damages, they assert it may be appropriate to reduce
recovery to further "the policy against overcompensation. ' 27  But
where the issue is causation, the plaintiff may be entitled to a joint and
several judgment against multiple defendants.28 The authors criticize
the Restatement of Torts for characterizing as multiple causes of an ac-
cident a municipality's negligent maintenance of a sidewalk and an ac-
cumulation of ice thereon.29 Viewing it instead as a damages issue,
they contend that courts should reduce recovery by the amount of dam-
age that the exercise of due care would not have prevented, i e., the
amount attributable to the ice accumulation.
The distinction Becht and Miller draw between the rules for deter-
22. See Green, supra note 19.
23. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note I, at 44.
24. Leflar, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1691 (1962).
25. Id. at 1693. Although Becht and Miller contend that the master is a cause of the servant's
wrong, they nevertheless agree with the opinion of Hart and Honor6 that "causation should be
traced from the servant, not the master in such cases." A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note I, at
167. Part II of their book, id. at 153-223, is a review of H. HART & A. HONOR, CAUSATION IN
THE LAW (1959), with which they largely agree.
26. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 1, at 127.
27. Id. at 124.
28. Id. at 104-20.
29. Id. at 136-37. "The ice had not been so long upon the sidewalk as to make it the duty of
the town to remove it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 432, illus. 5 (1934).
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mining cause and damages is questionable. It turns on the ability of
the defendant to prevent the other source of harm from occurring-a
factor unrelated to "the policy against overcompensation"3 supposedly
underlying the damages rule. Moreover, it is unrealistic to make the
distinction turn on whether the other source of harm would have oc-
curred "in spite of all the defendant could have done to prevent it,"'"
for example, by stationing a person on the sidewalk at all times.32
These issues of causation and damages vex the courts, particularly
since comparative negligence and comparative contribution have be-
come widely used in settling disputes.33 Courts divide on whether to
permit a joint and several judgment against multiple tortfeasors or limit
recovery against each tortfeasor to the amount of damage caused by his
negligence or conduct. 4 Further, courts divide on whether to require
apportionment where the defendant merely aggravates but does not
originally cause the injury.
When the determination of causation is truly speculative 36 Becht
30. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 1, at 124.
31. Id. at 136.
32. See id. at 124.
33. See. e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978) (comparative negligence); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 IUI. 2d I,
374 N.E.2d 437 (1977) (comparative contribution). These cases review the developing law; both
cases involve mixed claims of negligence and strict products liability. Where strict liability is
Involved, it may be necessary to compare causation rather than fault. See, e.g., Butaud v. Subur-
ban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976) (comparative negligence applied
where defendant held strictly liable). But see 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (1977). Professor Leflar criti-
cizes Becht and Miller for their "failure to mention comparative negligence and discuss the
problems of causation it presents in contributory negligence cases." Leflar, supra note 24, at 1693.
Note, however, that the widespread use of comparative negligence in this country is a recent de-
velopment. As late as 1968, only seven states embraced the doctrine. Wade, Crawford, & Ryder,
Comparative Negligence, 41 TENN. L. REv. 423, 444-45 (1974). The editor of the American Trial
Lawyer ' Reporter estimates that as of June 1978 "over 35 states by statutory or judicial change
have switched from contributory to comparative negligence." 21 A.T.L.A. L. RPTR. 200 (June
1978).
34. Compare American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) (joint and several judgment against all defendants), with Brown v. KeiU,
- Kan. -, 580 P.2d 867 (1978) (each defendant liable only for the portion of damages
caused by that defendant). Under the Brown rule, the plaintiff may find part of his damages
uncollectible if one or some of the defendants are insolvent or immune, or if a natural force causes
part of the damages. See A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 1, at 123 n.199 and authorities cited
therein.
35. Compare Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) (in crashworthiness case, plaintiff
must apportion damages and can recover from noncausal defendant only the amount by which he
aggravates the injury), with Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978) (in
crashworthiness case, plaintiff may recover entire judgment against aggravating defendant where
damages are incapable of practical division).
36. Much of the Becht and Miller book discusses cases of doubtful causation. The factual
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and Miller are in accord with Professor Malone;37 they would apply
evaluative considerations to resolve the issue.38 If recovery is the desir-
able outcome, they would jump the causation hurdle by lightening the
plaintiffs burden of proof or by shifting it to the defendant.39
Finally, will it make a difference in the outcome of a particular case
whether one adopts Malone's mixed factual-evaluative approach or
Becht and Miller's separation of the factual and evaluative elements?
Conceivably, in a case of doubtful causation, a prior examination of
the facts might lead to a different causation determination than one
based on a factual review colored by evaluative considerations, and this
different conclusion in turn might lead to a different outcome. But no
examples are apparent. Nor is a different outcome likely when the evi-
dence of factual causation or lack of causation is clearer, even if the
two approaches yield different conclusions on causation. Thus, Becht
and Miller conclude that speed is a factual cause of a party being at the
point where an unavoidable accident occurs; many courts using what is
apparently'an evaluative approach to factual causation conclude that
the speeding is not a cause.4 0 Nevertheless, the authors reach the same
conclusion of no liability as the courts do "because the rules against
speeding, whether by plaintiffs or defendants, are not designed to pre-
vent a person or object from being in a certain position in time and
space."' 4' Conversely, they would impose liability where a driver who
turns his automobile without signaling is struck by an inattentive
determination may often turn on slight differences of circumstances. For example, the authors
discuss situations of alternative compliances, one of which would relieve the defendant of liability
under the parallel series analysis while the other would not. They find it speculative whether the
defendant should have warned (no liability since the warning would not have prevented the harm)
or should have provided a safety guard (liability since the harm would have been prevented) for a
piece of dangerous machinery into which the plaintiff accidentally falls. A. BECHT & F. MILLER,
supra note 1, at 80-81. When the issue, however, is whether the defendant would have braced his
tree or removed it, where the latter would have avoided damage from a hurricane while the for-
mer would not, the authors would find for the defendant, apparently because of the greater likeli-
hood that an owner would brace a tree rather than remove it. Id. at 83-85. The differences in the
quantum of inferences leading to different results in the two situations may be slight indeed.
37. See Malone, supra note 2, at 73.
38. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 1, at 81, 86.
39. Id. at 86.
40. See, eg., Balfe v. Kramer, 249 App. Div. 746, 291 N.Y.S. 842 (1936); Berry v. Sugar
Notch Borough, 191 Pa. 345, 43 A. 240 (1899); Doss v. Town of Big Stone Gap, 145 Va. 520, 134
S.E. 563 (1926).
41. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 1, at 68. A railroad company, however, might have a
speed regulation "for, say, five minutes after passing a signal, for the purpose of allowing time for
other trains to clear the road ahead." Id. at 72-73. Violation of such a regulation with resulting
injury would then be legally and factually causal. Id.
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driver. The plaintiff, a passenger in the second driver's car, should be
able to recover against both drivers for his injury although "the negli-
gence of neither defendant" is a cause of the harm because it "seems
inexcusable to us" to deny recovery to the passenger.4a The authors
find no causation because even if either defendant had exercised due
care, he would not have avoided the accident.43 Professor Green, using
what is apparently an evaluative approach, would find factual causa-
tion and impose liability.'
Regardless of whether the authors would reach the same outcomes as
those who use an admittedly evaluative approach to factual causa-
tion,45 their book stands as a monumental achievement of analysis and
intelligence. As Professor Green says, "[t]he thorough detail of their
arguments make for difficult but profitable reading. '46 And Professor
Leflar says that
legal scholars are entitled to examine critically the law's purported logic
and to seek improvement in it for the sake of both its purity and a better
understanding of it. That is what Becht and Miller have done, and done
remarkably well. Their study is careful, comprehensive, illuminat-
ing-and unique.47
The value of Becht and Miller's book is to spur us to reach right results
for right reasons on matters of factual cause.
42. Id. at 96.
43. Id.
44. Green finds it "difficult to visualize such occurrences" without asking why the second
defendant did not see the first defendant's car even though no signal was given. Accepting the
hypothetical as presented, he would impose liability against the first driver because that driver
owed a duty to both the second driver and his passenger "not to drive across the path of the
oncoming car without giving a signal." He apparently would not hold the second driver liable,
however, because his failure to look was "not causally related to his own or his passenger's in-
jury." Green, supra note 19, at 545 n.4. If one accepts the apparent premise of the Becht-Miller
hypothetical, ie., the second driver could have seen nothing even if he were looking, then the
second driver should not be held liable. Apparently, the authors did not intend to imply that the
failure to signal would in effect render the first driver's car invisible because they would also hold
the second driver liable to the passenger.
45. See generally Green, supra note 19; Malone, supra note 2; Thode, The Indefensible Use of
the H;pothetical Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 TEX. L. REv. 423 (1968).
46. Green, supra note 19, at 543.
47. Leflar, supra note 24, at 1694.
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